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Abstract— Physical layer security is an emerging se-
curity area that explores possibilities of achieving per-
fect secrecy data transmission between the intended
network nodes, while possible malicious nodes that
eavesdrop the communication obtain zero information.
The so-called secrecy capacity can be improved using
friendly jammers that introduce extra interference to
the eavesdroppers. Here, we investigate the interac-
tion between the multiple source-destination links and
a friendly jammer who assists by “masking” the eaves-
dropper. In order to obtain a distributed solution, one
possibility is to introduce a distributed auction theo-
retic approach. The auction is deﬁned such that the
source-destination links provide bids for the jammer to
interfere the eavesdropper, therefore increasing their se-
crecy capacities. We propose a distributed auction us-
ing the share auction and iteratively updating the bids.
To compare with the performances, we construct a cen-
tralized solution and a VCG auction, which cannot be
implemented in practice. Our analysis and simulation
results show the eﬀectiveness of friendly jamming and
convergence of the proposed scheme. The distributed
game solution is shown to have similar performances to
those of the centralized ones.
I. Introduction
The design of the future wireless networks will have
to put a huge eﬀort on the security. The main rea-
son for that is that future networks will be decentral-
ized and ad-hoc in nature, and, hence, allowing vari-
ous types of network mobile terminals to join and leave.
This makes the entire network vulnerable and very sen-
sitive to attacks. Because of the broadcast nature of
the wireless transmission, anyone within communica-
tion range can intercept the data that was not intended
to her. In such a complex environment, the current
cryptographic methods with high level security, may
not work. This may happen due to diﬃculty to ex-
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change public keys in such an ad hoc network. To that
end it is of big importance to study the possibility of
designing a decentralized network with perfect secu-
rity on physical layer. For that reason, recently, the
physical layer security is regaining a new attention.
The main goal of this paper is to design a decentral-
ized system that will protect the broadcasted data and
make it impossible for the eavesdropper to receive the
packets even if it knows the standard encoding and de-
coding schemes used by the transmitter and receiver,
respectively. In systems where physical layer security
is studied, the main objective is to maximize the rate
of reliable information from the source to the intended
destination, while all malicious nodes are kept as igno-
rant of that information as possible. This maximum
reliable rate is known as secrecy capacity.
The secrecy capacity work was pioneered by Aaron
Wyner, who deﬁned the wiretap channel and estab-
lished fundamental results that enable creating almost
perfect secure communications with no need of private
(secret) keys [1] exchange. Wyner showed that when
the eavesdropper channel is a degraded (weaker) ver-
sion of the main channel, the source and the destina-
tion can exchange perfectly secure messages at posi-
tive rate. With his scheme, a maximal equivocation
(i.e., uncertainty) is induced at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
a maximal level of secrecy is obtained. By ensuring
that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily close to the
message rate, one can achieve perfect secrecy in the
sense that the eavesdropper is now limited to learn
almost nothing about the source-destination messages
from its observations. Follow-up work by Leung-Yan-
Cheong and Hellman characterized the secrecy capac-
ity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wire-
tap channel [2]. In their seminal paper, Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner generalized Wyner’s approach by considering
the transmission of conﬁdential messages over broad-
cast channels [3]. Recently, the research in the area
of physical layer security exploded. There have been
2considerable eﬀorts on generalizing these studies to the
wireless channel and multi-user scenarios (see [2,4–11]
and references therein). Jamming [12–14] has been
studied for a long time to analyze the hostile behav-
iors of malicious nodes. Recently, jamming has been
employed to physical layer security to reduce the eaves-
dropper’s ability to decode the source’s information
[15]. In other words, the jamming is friendly in this
context.
Game theory [16] is a formal framework with a set
of mathematical tools to study some complex interac-
tions among interdependent rational players. During
the past decade, there has been a surge in research ac-
tivities that employ game theory to model and analyze
modern distributed communication systems. Most of
these works [17–20] concentrate on the distributed re-
source allocation for wireless networks. As far as the
authors’ knowledge, the game theory has not yet been
used in the physical layer security. In [21], Stackel-
burg game is employed for multiple jammer one source-
destination case. In this paper, we employ auction the-
ory [22] which is an important branch of game theory
for one jammer multiple source-destination scenario.
In this paper, we investigate the interaction between
the source-destination pairs and its friendly jammer
using auction theory. Although the friendly jammer
helps the sources by reducing the data rate that is
“leaking” from the sources to the malicious node, at
the same time it also reduces the useful data rate from
the sources to the destinations. Using well chosen
amounts of power from the friendly jammer, the se-
crecy capacity can be maximized. In the auction that
we deﬁne here, the source-destination pairs provide
bids for the jammer to interfere the malicious eaves-
dropper, and therefore, to increase the secrecy capac-
ity. In modeling the outcome of the above auction, our
analysis uses the distributed share auction. Initially,
the existence of equilibrium will be studied. The out-
come of the distributed algorithm will be compared
to the centralized genie aided solution and (Vickrey-
Clarke-Grove) VCG auction [22]. From the simulation
results, we can see the eﬃciency of friendly jamming
and the convergence of the bids. Moreover, the central-
ized scheme and the proposed game scheme has similar
performances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, the system model of physical layer security
with friendly jamming is described. In Section III, the
distributed auction theory model is formulated, and
the outcomes as well as properties of the auction are
analyzed. In Section IV, two performance bounds are
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developed to compare with the proposed scheme. Sim-
ulation results are shown in Section V and conclusions
are drawn in Section VI.
II. System Model
We consider a network with multiple sources si, des-
tinations di, a malicious eavesdropper node m, and a
friendly jammer node J as shown in Figure 1. The
malicious node tries to eavesdrop the transmitted data
coming from the source nodes. When the eavesdrop-
per channel from the source to the malicious node is a
degraded version of the main source-destination chan-
nel, the source and destination can exchange perfectly
secure messages at a non-zero rate. By transmitting
a message at a rate higher than the rate of the mali-
cious node, the malicious node can learn almost noth-
ing about the messages from its observations. The
maximum rate of secrecy information from the source
to its intended destination is deﬁned by the term se-
crecy capacity.
Suppose the source si transmits with power Pi. The
channel gains from the source to the destination and
from the source to the malicious node are Gsidi and
Gsim, respectively. The friendly jammer J , transmits
with power P Ji and the channel gains from J to the
destination and the malicious node, are GJdi and GJm,
respectively. If the path loss model is used, the channel
gain is given by the distance to the negative power of
the path loss coeﬃcient. The thermal noise for each
channel is σ2 and the bandwidth is W . The channel
3capacity for the source i to the destination i is
Ci1 = W log2
(
1 +
PiGsidi
σ2 + P Ji GJdi
)
. (1)
The channel capacity from the source to the malicious
node is
Ci2 = W log2
(
1 +
PiGsim
σ2 + P Ji GJm
)
. (2)
Note that here we assume that there is no interference
from the other sources, since only one source at a time
transmits its own data.
The secrecy capacity is
Csi = max(C
i
1 − Ci2, 0). (3)
We observe that with the increase of the jamming
power P Ji , both C1 and C2 are reduced. The questions
are whether or not Csi can be increased, and how to
control the jamming power in a distributed manner.
We will try to solve the problems in the following sec-
tion using an auction theoretical approach.
III. Proposed Auction Theoretic Approach
Here we propose an auction theory approach, in
which the source si is the bidder, while the jammer
J is the auctioneer. The bidder will submit a bid to
compete for the P Ji in order to increase their own util-
ity which is represented by the secrecy capacity. The
jammer J has maximal power Pmax and distributes
P Ji following the rule of an auction. An auction is
a decentralized market mechanism for allocating re-
sources. The essence of an auction is a game, where
the players are the bidders, the strategies are the bids,
and both allocations and payments are functions of the
bids. The type of auction depends the outcome of the
system. One well known auction is the Vickrey-Clarke-
Grove (VCG) auction, which requires gathering global
information from the network and performing central-
ized computations. To overcome the limitation of VCG
auction, we proposed SNR auction which is based on
Share-Auction [22–25] as follows:
• Information: Besides the public and local informa-
tion (i.e., W , P , σ2, Psi , Gsidi). The jammer J an-
nounces a positive reserve bid β. And a price π ≥ 0 to
all users before the auction starts.
• Bids: User i submits a scalar bi ≥ 0 to the jammer
J.
• Allocation: The jammer allocates transmit power ac-
cording to
P Ji =
biPmax
β +
∑
j∈i bj
. (4)
• Payment: In the proposed auction, source si pays
the jammer
ci = πP Ji . (5)
A bidder proﬁle is deﬁned as the vector containing
the users’ bids, b = (b1, ..., bI). We deﬁne the oth-
ers’ bid vector as b−i, so that b = (bi; b−i). Source si
chooses bi to maximize its payoﬀ
Ui(bi; b−i, π) = ΔCsi(Pi(bi;b−i))− ci(bi; b−i, π), (6)
where ΔCsi is the secrecy capacity change.
The desirable outcome of an auction is called a Nash
Equilibrium (NE), which is a bidding proﬁle b∗ such
that no user wants to deviate unilaterally, i.e.,
Ui(b∗i ; b
∗
−i, π) ≥ Ui(bi; b∗−i, π),∀bi. (7)
Deﬁne source si’s best response as
bi(b−i, π) = {bi|bi = argmax
bi≥0
Ui(bi; b−i, π)}. (8)
Here, we omit the dependence on β. If the reserve
bid β = 0, then the bids in (8) only depends on the
ratio of the bids. In other words, a bidding proﬁle
kb for any k > 0 leads to the same resource allocation,
which is not desirable in practice. That is why we need
a positive reserve bid. However, the value of β is not
important as long as it is positive. For example, if we
increase β to kβ, where k > 0, then the sources can
just scale b to kb, which results in the same resource
allocation. For simplicity, we can simply choose β = 1
in practice.
If the others’ bids b−i are ﬁxed, source i can increase
the jammer’s power to increase its Ui by increasing
bi. However, the payoﬀ faction needs to pay the price
for P Ji . Depending one diﬀerent price per unit π an-
nounced by the relay, there are three diﬀerent scenar-
ios:
1. If π is too small, the payoﬀ function Ui is still an
increasing function. As a result, the source tries to
maximize its own beneﬁt by setting price high. Con-
sequently, bi →∞.
2. If π is too large, the payoﬀ function Ui is a de-
creasing function. As a result, the source would not
participate in the bidding by setting bi = 0.
3. If π is set to the right value, the payoﬀ function Ui
is a quasi-concave shape function, i.e., it increases ﬁrst
and then decreases within the feasible region. Conse-
quently, there is an optimal bi for the source to opti-
mize its performance.
4IV. Performance Bounds
In this section, we propose two performance bounds.
First, we formulate the problem as a constrained opti-
mization and solve it using a centralized solution. The
challenge of collecting all information prohibits this so-
lution from practice. Second, we investigate VCG auc-
tion which generates the social optimum. However,
the computation complexity is very high. Those two
bounds have similar performances. In Section V, we
compare the proposed scheme with those two perfor-
mance bounds.
A. Centralized Problem Formulation
Traditionally, the centralized scheme is employed as-
suming all channel information is known. Unfortu-
nately, it is extremely diﬃcult to achieve. The ob-
jective to optimize the secrecy capacity under the con-
straints of maximal jamming power.
max
PJi
N∑
i=1
Csi , (9)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
P Ji ≤ Pmax.
The centralized solution is found by maximizing the
secrecy capacity only.
B. VCG Auction
In this subsection, we investigate a performance up-
per bound similar to the VCG auction proposed in
the literature and compared with our proposed ap-
proach. In the performance upper bound, the jammer
asks all sources to reveal their evaluations of the jam-
mer’s power, upon which the jammer calculates the
optimal power allocation and allocates accordingly. A
source pays the “performance loss” of other sources in-
duced by its own participation of the auction. In the
context of wireless secrecy capacity, the performance
upper bound can be described as follows:
• Information: Public available information includes
noise density σ2 and bandwidth W . Source si knows
channel gain Gsidi and Gsim. The jammer knows chan-
nel gains GJdi for all i, and can estimate the chan-
nel gains GJm for all i when it receives bids from the
sources.
• Bids: Source si submits ΔCsi
(
P Ji (bi; b−i)
)
to the
jammer, which represents the secrecy capacity increase
as a function of the jammer parameter P Ji .
• Allocation: The jammer determines the power allo-
cation P = [P J1 . . . P
J
N ] by solving the following prob-
lem
P∗ = argmax
P
∑
j∈I
Csj
(
P Jj
)
. (10)
• Payments: For each source si, the jammer solves the
following problem
P∗/i = arg max
P,Pi=0
∑
j
Csj
(
P Jj
)
, (11)
i.e, the total distortion decreases without allocating
resource to source i. The payment of source i is then
ci =
∑
j =i,j∈I
Csj
(
P
∗/i
j
)
−
∑
j =i,j∈I
Csj
(
P ∗j
)
, (12)
i.e., the performance loss of all other sources because
of including source i in the allocation.
The resource allocation as calculated in (10) achieves
the eﬃcient allocation as shown in [22]. This is the rea-
son why we select the VCG auction as our performance
bound. The auction can achieve the eﬃcient allocation
in one shot, by allowing the power to gather a lot of
information and perform heavy but local computation.
Although the performance upper bound has the de-
sirable social optimal, it is usually computationally ex-
pensive for the relay to solve I + 1 nonconvex opti-
mization problems. To solve a nonconvex optimiza-
tion, the common solution like interior point method
needs a complexity of O(I2). As the result, the overall
complexity for the performance upper bound is O(I3),
while the proposed auction algorithm has linear com-
plexity. Furthermore, there is a signiﬁcant communi-
cation overhead to submit Csi
(
P Ji
)
for each source i.
In the proposed scheme, the bids and the correspond-
ing resource allocation are iteratively updated. This is
similar to the distributed power control case, where the
signal-to-interference-noise ratio and power update are
iteratively obtained. As a result, the overall signalling
can be reduced.
V. Preliminary Simulations
To investigate the performances, we conduct the fol-
lowing two simulations. The setup is as follows: There
are two source-destination pairs; each source transmits
with 10 mW, the noise power is -90 dBm; the maximal
power is 100 mW for the jammer; the bandwidth is
unit, W = 1; the propagation loss factor is 3; β = 1;
the sources are located at (500 m,0 m) and (500 m,1000
m), respectively; the destinations are located at (1000
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m,0 m) and (1000 m,1000 m), respectively, the mali-
cious node is located at (250 m,500 m), and π = 1.
First we study the convergence of the proposed auc-
tion approach. The jammer is located at (0 m,1000
m). In Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5, we show the bids, util-
ities, allocated jamming power and secrecy capacities
as a function of iteration, respectively. Here, we use
the simple update function by allowing the bids to be
varied by 5% in each iteration. We can see that the
proposed scheme converges.
Next, we investigate if the converged solution opti-
mal. We change the location of the jammer from (0
m,0 m) to (0 m,1000 m). In Figures 6 and 7, we show
the jamming power and secrecy capacities as a function
of the jammer location. We can see that the proposed
distributed auction has the similar performance as the
performance bounds. Moreover, the secrecy capacity
is greatly improved compared with no jammer case.
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VI. Conclusions
Physical layer security is an emerging security
technique that is an alternative for traditional
cryptographic-based protocols to achieves perfect se-
crecy capacity as eavesdroppers obtain zero informa-
tion. Jamming has been shown in the literature to
eﬀectively improve secrecy capacity. In this paper,
we investigate the interaction between multiple source-
destinations and one friendly jammer using the auction
theory so as to have a distributed solution. The sources
provide bids to the friendly jammer to interfere the ma-
licious eavesdropper so as to increase the secrecy ca-
pacity. To analyze the auction outcome, we investigate
the Share auction and construct the distributed algo-
rithm. Some properties such as equilibrium and con-
vergence are analyzed. From the simulation results, we
can see the convergence and optimality of the proposed
scheme.
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